

Professor Karen Ferree
Office: 391 Social Sciences Building
Phone: (858) 822-2309
Office Hours: by appointment

Winter Quarter 2010
Fridays 9:00 – 11:50, 12:00 – 2:50
E-mail: keferree@weber.ucsd.edu
<http://weber.ucsd.edu/~keferree/>

PS220B: COMPARATIVE POLITICS/INSTITUTIONS

Objectives

This seminar, like Political Science 220 (Comparative Politics: State and Society), is designed to help students prepare for the comprehensive examination in comparative politics and for research in comparative politics, including doctoral dissertations. Though this seminar covers a wide range of subjects, it cannot do so exhaustively; among the subjects only tangentially treated are political development, mass behavior, judicial institutions, bureaucratic politics, and public policy. Students preparing for the comprehensive exam should therefore seek other opportunities to study these topics.

Format

Seminar meetings are scheduled for the ten teaching weeks of the quarter. Generally, each week will introduce a new theme in the comparative study of political institutions. The reading list distinguishes between two categories of readings: required and recommended. *Required* readings will form the basis of the general seminar discussions, and all students should read them carefully and critically before class. *Recommended* readings are additional readings of broad theoretical importance, with which students preparing for the comprehensive exam should gain some familiarity. Students will do short presentations on each required reading on the list.

Assignments

All students taking the seminar for credit must do the assigned readings, write three discussion papers (5-7 pages in length), participate actively in the seminar discussions, and give regular presentations on the readings.

Each week, students will be assigned specific readings to review. These presentations should summarize the article or book chapter (dependent variable, independent variables, causal argument), comment critically on it (What does it leave out or fail to explain? What assumptions does it make? Are they justified?), discuss how the piece fits in with the other selections of the week (and course, if appropriate), and raise a couple of questions to stimulate discussion. Students giving presentations should prepare brief outlines of the article for distribution to the other seminar participants. NOTE: students are expected to do *all* of the required reading and to be prepared to discuss it, not just their particular assignment. Thus, being the reviewer for one article does not excuse you from commenting intelligently on the others!!

The discussion papers are due before the class session in question. The object of the papers is two-fold. The first objective is to *make an argument* about the week's readings. Thus, early in the paper (first paragraph), there should be a line that says: "in this paper, I argue that . . ." (Or something closely related). The argument should be stated clearly and concisely and the rest of the paper should tie into this argument. The second objective is to *review in a critical fashion some or all of the week's readings*. In the process of providing supporting evidence for your argument, you should identify the some of central issues that the assigned reading for the week addresses, locate the principal authors' positions vis-à-vis those issues, and comment critically on the state of the debate and the value of the individual contributions to it. *Your analysis of the reading should go beyond summary of the readings toward critical commentary and a discussion of the issues that unite the work; it should also tie in with the overall argument that you are making in the papers.* Good papers will do meet both objectives: they will make an argument *and* they will provide careful reviews of some or all of the reading. Writing style matters! Be focused and selective and avoid long quotations. (For more information – see handout "How to Write a Good Social Science Paper.") You should do one paper from one week in the first third of the class (weeks 2-4), one paper from one week in the second third of the class (weeks 5-7), and one paper from one week in the final third of the class (weeks 8-10).

Grades will be based on course assignments in the following way: discussion papers, 20% each; general participation, 20%; weekly reviews, 20%. Extensions, incompletes, etc. will be given in accordance with UCSD policy. Except under **very pressing circumstances**, they will be discouraged. If you must miss a class, please talk to me about an alternative assignment.

Readings

Many of the readings are in article form and can be found easily on the web. If you have trouble locating something, contact me and I'll make a copy available. The remainder of the readings comes from books. The following is a list of books from which multiple chapters will be assigned:

- Gary W. Cox, *Making Votes Count*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999.
Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., *The Failure of Presidential Democracy*. Volume 1. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994.
Adam Przeworski et al., *Democracy and Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
George Tsebelis. *Veto Players*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.
Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Carles Boix. *Democracy and redistribution*. New York : Cambridge University Press, 2003.
G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Elections as Instruments of Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000.
Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart, eds., *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller and Torbjörn Bergman, eds., *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
Angelo Panebianco. *Political Parties: Organization and Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Stephan Haggard and Mathew McCubbins, eds. *Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

1. INTRODUCTION: INSTITUTIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (1/8)

Required:

- James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Institutional Perspectives on Political Institutions. *Governance* 9, 3 (July 1996), 247-64 .
Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 1, 2 (April 1989), 131-147.
Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen, and Frank Longstreth, eds., *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, ch. 1.
Adam Przeworski, "Institutions Matter?" *Government and Opposition* 39, 2004: 527-540.

Recommended:

- Symposium on "The Return to the State," *American Political Science Review* 82, 3 (September 1988), 853-901.
Robert Bates et al., *Analytical Narratives*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.
John M. Carey, Parchment, Equilibria, and Institutions. *Comparative Political Studies* 33, 6-7 (August-September 2000), 735-61.
Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell, eds., *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
Thráinn Eggertsson, *Economic Behavior and Institutions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., *Bringing the State Back In*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Jack Knight, *Institutions and Social Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions*. New York: Free Press, 1989.
James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, *Democratic Governance*. New York: Free Press, 1995.

- Terry M. Moe, "The New Economics of Organization," *American Journal of Political Science* 28, 4 (November 1984), 739-777.
- Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Elinor Ostrom, *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics. *American Political Science Review* 94, 2 (June 2000), 251-67.
- Avner Greif. *Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, Chs. 1, 2, and 5.
- Andrew Schotter. *The Economic Theory of Social Institutions* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
- Oliver E. Williamson. "Transaction Cost Economics," in Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig (eds.) *Handbook of Industrial Organization*. New York: North Holland, 1989.
- Douglass C. North, "Institutions," *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 5: 97-112.
- George Tsebelis. *Nested Games*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990, Chs. 2 and 4.
- Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach," *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 1: 131-147
- Terry Moe, "Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story," *Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization*, Vol. 6, Special Issue: 213-253 (and also comments by Oliver E. Williamson, pp. 263-266).
- Robert H. Bates, and Barry R. Weingast, "A New Comparative Politics: Integrating Rational Choice and Interpretivists Perspectives," *Working Paper No. 95-3*, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University.
- James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, "Institutional Perspectives on Political Institutions," *Governance*, 9: 247-64 .
- David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks, "Social Choice Theory, Game Theory, and Positive Political Theory," *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 1: 259-287.
- Barry R. Weingast, "Rational Choice Institutionalism," in Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner, (eds.). *Political Science Discipline as Discipline: Reconsidering Power, Choice, and the State*. New York: Norton, 2002.
- Randall Calvert, "The rational choice theory of social institutions: cooperation, coordination, and communication," in Jeffrey Banks and Eric Hanushek (eds.). *Modern Political Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- David D. Laitin, "The Perestroika Challenge to Social Science," *Politics & Society*, 3: 163-184.

2. DEMOCRACY VS. AUTOCRACY (1/15)

Required:

- Barry R. Weingast, "Political foundations of democracy and the rule of law," *American Political Science Review*, 91: 245-263.
- Adam Przeworski et al., *Democracy and Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, chs. 1 and 2.
- Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, Chs. 1-3.
- Carles Boix. *Democracy and redistribution*. New York : Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 1-59.
- Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, ch. 3.
- Philip G. Roeder, *Red Sunset*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993, chs. 1-2.

Recommended:

- Barry Ames, *Political Survival: Politicians and Public Policy in Latin America*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987.
- Susan Rose-Ackerman, *Corruption and Government*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, chs. 1, 3, 7, and 11.
- Edward Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*. Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1958.
- Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle, "Popular Protest and Political Reform in Africa," *Comparative Politics* 24, 4 (July 1992), 419-442.
- Samuel Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976.
- James DeNardo, *Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985.
- Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*. New York: Praeger, 1956.
- Albert O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice and Loyalty*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970.
- Mancur Olson, *Power and Prosperity*. New York: Basic Books, 2000.
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Political Instability as a Source of Growth. Hoover Institution, Essays in Public Policy No.99.
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Hilton L. Root, eds., *Governing for Prosperity*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000.
- Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.
- Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin. *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- John Helliwell. "Empirical Linkages between Democracy and Economic Growth." *British Journal of Political Science* 24(2): 225-48.
- Stephan Haggard and Steven B. Webb, eds., *Voting for Reform: Democracy, Political Liberalization and Economic Adjustment*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
- Susan C. Stokes, ed. *Public Support for Market Reforms in New Democracies*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Karen Remmer, "The Political Economy of Elections in Latin America." *American Political Science Review* 87(June, 1993): 393-407.
- Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, *Personal Rule: Theory and Practice in Africa*. *Comparative Politics* 16, 4 (July 1984), 421-42.
- Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982.
- Ken Jowitt, *The New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992.
- Margaret Levi, *Of Rule and Revenue*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.
- Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.
- Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977.
- Amos Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.
- Susan Shirk, *The Political Logic of Economic Reform in China*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.
- Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, *The Grabbing Hand: Government Pathologies and their Cures*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998.
- Peter H. Smith, *Argentina and the Failure of Democracy: Conflict Among Political Elites, 1904-1955*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974.
- Alfred Stepan, *Rethinking Military Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.
- Gordon Tullock, *Autocracy*. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1987.
- Ronald Wintrobe, The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship. *American Political Science Review* 84, 3 (September 1990), 850-72.
- Guillermo O'Donnell. "Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State." *Latin American Research Review*, 13(1), 1978: 3-38.
- Adam Przeworski, "Democracy as an Equilibrium," *Public Choice*, 123: 253-273.
- John B. Londregan and Keith T. Poole, "Does High Income Promote Democracy?," *World Politics*, 49: 1-30.

Roger Myerson, "The Autocrat's Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitutional State," *American Political Science Review*, 102: 125-139.

3. CONSENSUAL VERSUS MAJORITARIAN DEMOCRACY (1/22)

Required:

- Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy*, chs. 1-4 and 14-17.
- John Ferejohn. "Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control." *Public Choice* 30, Fall 1986: 5-25.
- James Fearon. "Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance." In *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*, edited by Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Elections as Instruments of Democracy*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000, chs. 1-2, and 10.
- Richard Rose, The End of Consensus in Austria and Switzerland. *Journal of Democracy* 11, 2 (April 2000), 26-40.
- George Tsebelis, *Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990, ch. 6.

Recommended:

- Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Comparative Politics: System, Process, and Policy*. Second edition. Boston: Little, Brown, 1978, esp. ch. 3.
- Keith G. Banting and Richard Simeon, eds., *Redesigning the State: The Politics of Constitutional Change*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1985.
- Albert Breton, *Competitive Governments*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Albert Breton et al., eds, *Understanding Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997.
- Robert A. Dahl and Edward R. Tufte, *Size and Democracy*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973.
- Jon Elster and Rune Slagstad, *Constitutionalism and Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- W. Arthur Lewis, *Politics in West Africa*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1965.
- Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.
- Arend Lijphart, *Power-Sharing in South Africa*. Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1985.
- G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Contemporary Democracies*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982.
- Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle, *Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory of Democratic Instability*. Columbus, Ohio: Merrill, 1972.
- Stein Rokkan and Derek W. Urwin, *Economy, Territory, Identity*. London: Sage, 1983.
- Jürg Steiner, *Amicable Agreement versus Majority Rule: Conflict Resolution in Switzerland*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1974.
- R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, eds., *Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993.
- Pippa Norris, "Ballots Not Bullets: Testing Consociational Theories of Ethnic Conflict, Electoral Systems, and Democratization," in *The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy*, edited by Andrew Reynolds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 206-247.

4. FEDERALISM (1/29)

Required:

- Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy*, chs. 10 and 12.
- William H. Riker, "Federalism." In *Handbook of Political Science*, eds. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby. Vol. 5, pp. 93-172.

- Ellen Comisso, "Federalism and Nationalism in Post-Socialist Eastern Europe," *New Europe Law Review* 1(2), Spring 1993:489-503.
- Barry R. Weingast, "The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 11, 1, 1-31.
- Daniel Treisman, "Political Decentralization and Economic Reform." *American Journal of Political Science* 43, 2 (April 1999), 488-517.
- Jonathan Rodden, "The Dilemma of Fiscal Federalism: Grant and Fiscal Performance around the World." *American Journal of Political Science* 46(3), July 2002: 670-687.
- Samuels, David. 2000. "Concurrent Elections, Discordant Results: Presidentialism, Federalism, and Governance in Brazil." *Comparative Politics* 33(1): 1-20.

Recommended:

The Federalist Papers

- K.C. Wheare. *Federal Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946.
- Charles Tiebout. "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures." *Journal of Political Economy* 64, 1956: 416-24.
- William H. Riker, *Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance*. Boston: Little, Brown, 1964.
- Ivo D. Duchacek, *Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimension of Politics*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1970.
- Daniel Elazar. *American Federalism: A View from the States*. New York: Crowell, 1966.
- David R. Beam et al., "Federalism: The Challenge of Conflicting Theories and Contemporary Practice," in Ada Finifter, ed., *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*. Washington, DC: American Political Science Association, 1983, ch. 9.
- Preston King, *Federalism and Federation*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982.
- Kenneth McRoberts. "Federal Structures and the Policy Process," in *Governing Canada: Institutions and Public Policy*, edited by Michael M. Atkinson. Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Canada Inc., 1993.
- Susanne Lohmann. "Federalism and Central Bank Autonomy: The Politics of German Monetary Policy, 1957-1992." *World Politics* 50, 1998: 401-446.
- Daniel Treisman, *After the Deluge: Regional Crises and Political Consolidation in Russia*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999.
- Jacques Cremer and Thomas Palfrey. "Political Confederation." *American Political Science Review* 93, 1999: 69-93.
- Daniel Treisman. "Decentralization and Inflation: Commitment, Collective Action, or Continuity?" *American Political Science Review* 94, 2000: 837-858.
- Samuels, David. 2000. "The Gubernatorial Coattails Effect: Federalism and Congressional Elections in Brazil." *The Journal of Politics* 62(1): 240-253.
- Erik Wibbels, "Federalism and the Politics of Macroeconomic Policy and Performance," *American Journal of Political Science* 44(4), October 2000: 687-702.
- Yash Pal Ghai, "Constitutional Asymmetries: Communal Representation, Federalism, and Cultural Autonomy," in *The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy*, edited by Andrew Reynolds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 141-170.
- Steven L. Solnick, "Federalism and State-Building: Post-Communist and Post-Colonial Perspectives," in *The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy*, edited by Andrew Reynolds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 171-205.
- Rotimi T. Suberu and Larry Diamond, "Institutional Design, Ethnic Conflict Management, and Democracy in Nigeria," in *The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy*, edited by Andrew Reynolds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, 400-428.
- Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks, "Unraveling the Central State, but how? Types of Multi-level Governance," *American Political Science Review*, 97(2), May 2003: 233- 243.
- Charlie Jeffery. "Federalism and Territorial Politics," in *Developments in German Politics* 3, edited by Stephen Padgett, William E. Paterson, and Gordon Smith. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.
- Hongbin Cai and Daniel Triesman. "State Corroding Federalism." *Journal of Public Economics*, 88(3-4, March 2004): 819-843.
- William M. Chandler, "Federalism and Political Parties," in *Federalism and the Role of the State*, edited by Herman Bakvis and William M. Chandler, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987.

5. PRESIDENTIALISM AND EXECUTIVES (2/5)

Required:

- Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy*, chs. 7 and 13.
- Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., *The Failure of Presidential Democracy: Comparative Perspectives*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994, chs. 1(Linz) and 4 (Stepan and Skach).
- Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart, eds., *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, chs. 1 and 11.
- Matthew S. Shugart and John M. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, chs. 1-2, 5, and 13.
- Jose Antonio Cheibub, "Presidentialism and Democratic Performance." In *The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy*, edited by Andrew Reynolds, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Recommended:

- Joel D. Aberbach, Robert D. Putnam, and Bert A. Rockman, *Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.
- Jean Blondel and Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, eds., *Governing Together*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993.
- Albert Breton, "The Organization of Competition in Congressional and Parliamentary Governments." In *The Competitive State*, ed. Albert Breton, Gianluigi Galeotti, Pierre Salmon, and Ronald Wintrobe. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991.
- John M. Carey and Matthew S. Shugart, eds., *Executive Decree Authority*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Maurice Duverger, "A New Political System Model: Semi-Presidential Government," *European Journal of Political Research* 8, 2 (June 1980), 165-87.
- Donald L. Horowitz, Seymour Martin Lipset, and Juan J. Linz, "Debate--Presidents vs. Parliaments," *Journal of Democracy* 1, 4 (Fall 1990), 73-91.
- Arend Lijphart, ed., *Parliamentary versus Presidential Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
- Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism in Latin America," *Latin American Research Review* 25, 1 (1990), 157-79.
- Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination." *Comparative Political Studies* 26, 2 (July 1993), 198-228.
- G. Bingham Powell, Jr., "Constitutional Design and Citizen Electoral Control," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 1, 2 (April 1989), 107-30.
- Adam Przeworski, Susan C. Stokes, and Bernard Manin, eds., *Democracy, Accountability, and Representation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- R. Kent Weaver and Bert A. Rockman, eds., *Do Institutions Matter? Government Capabilities in the United States and Abroad*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1993.

6. PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY (2/12)

Required:

- Gary W. Cox, *The Efficient Secret*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987, ch. 6.
- Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy*, ch. 6.
- Michael J. Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle, "Coalitions and Cabinet Government," *American Political Science Review* 84, 3 (September 1990), 873-90.
- Lanny W. Martin and Randolph T. Stevenson, Government Formation in Parliamentary Democracies. *American Journal of Political Science* 45, 1 (January 2001), 33-50.
- Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Müller and Torbjörn Bergman, eds., *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Chapters 3 and 22.

Recommended:

- David Austen-Smith and Jeffrey S. Banks, "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes," *American Political Science Review* 82, 2 (June 1988), 405-422.
- Sean Bowler, David M. Farrell, and Richard S. Katz, eds., *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1999.
- Abram De Swaan, *Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations: A Study of Formal Theories of Coalition Formation Applied to Nine European Parliaments after 1918*. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1973.
- Daniel Diermeier and Randolph T. Stevenson, Coalition Terminations and Critical Events. *American Political Science Review* 94, 3 (September 2000), 627-40.
- Lawrence C. Dodd, *Coalitions in Parliamentary Government*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, esp. chs. 1-3, 10-11.
- Michael J. Laver and Kenneth A. Shepsle, *Making and Breaking Governments*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Gregory M. Luebbert, *Comparative Democracy: Policymaking and Governing Coalitions in Europe and Israel*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986.
- Arthur W. Lupia and Kaare Strøm, "Coalition Termination and the Strategic Timing of Parliamentary Elections." *American Political Science Review* 89, 3 (September 1995), 648-65.
- Terry M. Moe and Michael Caldwell, "The Institutional Foundations of Democratic Government: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems," and comments by Gebhard Kirchgässner and Arthur Lupia. *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* 150/1, 171-210.
- Wolfgang C. Müller and Kaare Strøm, eds., *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Matthew S. Palmer, "The Economics of Organization and Ministerial Responsibility." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 11, 1 (1995), 165-88.
- William H. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962, esp. chs. 1, 2, 4.
- Kaare Strøm, *Minority Government and Majority Rule*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Kaare Strøm, Ian Budge, and Michael J. Laver, Constraints on Cabinet Formation in Parliamentary Democracies. *American Journal of Political Science* 38, 2 (May 1994), 303-35.
- Paul Warwick, *Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

7. ELECTORAL RULES (2/19)**Required:**

- Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy*, chs. 5 and 8.
- Charles Boix, Setting the Rules of the Game: The Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies. *American Political Science Review* 93, 3 (September 1999), 609-24.
- Gary W. Cox, *Making Votes Count*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, chs. 1-4, 8, and 15.
- Carey, John, and Matthew Shugart. 1995. "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote." *Electoral Studies* 14(4): 417-439.

Recommended:

- Michel L. Balinski and H. Peyton Young, *Fair Representation: Meeting the Ideal of One Man, One Vote*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982.
- Kathleen Bawn, "The Logic of Institutional Preferences: German Electoral Law as a Social Choice Outcome." *American Journal of Political Science* 37, 4 (November 1993), 965-89.
- Gary W. Cox, "Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems," *American Journal of Political Science* 34, 4 (November 1990), 903-935.
- Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper and Row, 1957.
- Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*. New York: Wiley, 1954.
- Robert W. Jackman, "Political Institutions and Voter Turnout in the Industrial Democracies," *American Political Science Review* 81, 2 (June 1987), 405-23.

- Richard S. Katz, *A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980.
- Michael J. Laver, "Party Competition and Party System Change," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 1, 3 (July 1989), 301-324.
- Arend Lijphart, *Electoral Systems and Party Systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics*. Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1963.
- G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability and Violence*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982, ch. 5.
- G. Bingham Powell, Jr., "American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective," *American Political Science Review* 80, 1 (March 1986), 17-43.
- Adam Przeworski and John Sprague, *Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986.
- Douglas W. Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967.
- William H. Riker, "The Two-Party System and Duverger's Law." *American Political Science Review* 76, 4 (December 1982), 753-766.
- Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976.
- Matthew S. Shugart and John Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, chs. 10-11.
- Rein Taagepera and Matthew S. Shugart, *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989.

8. PARTIES AND PARTY SYSTEMS (2/26)

Required:

- Giovanni Sartori. *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976, chapter 6.
- Angelo Panebianco. *Political Parties: Organization and Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- Wolfgang C. Muller and Kaare Strom, eds., *Policy, Office, or Votes: How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, ch. 1.
- Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds., *Parties without Partisans*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, chs. 2-3.
- Gary W. Cox, *Making Votes Count*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, chs. 10 and 12.
- Scott Mainwaring and Timothy R. Scully, eds., *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995, ch. 1.
- Kitschelt, Herbert and Steven I. Wilkinson. 2007. "Citizen-politician linkages: an introduction." In *Patrons, Clients, and Politics: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, edited by Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Recommended:

- Jens Alber, "Modernization, Cleavage Structures, and the Rise of Green Parties and Lists in Europe." Pp. 195-210 in *New Politics in Western Europe*, ed. Ferdinand Müller-Rommel. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1989.
- Stefano Bartolini, *The Political Mobilization of the European Left, 1860-1980*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
- André Blais, Donald Blake, and Stéphanie Dion, "Do Parties Make a Difference?" *American Journal of Political Science* 37, 1 (February 1993), 40-62.
- Carles Boix, *Political Parties, Growth and Equality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Gary W. Cox and Frances M. Rosenbluth, "The Electoral Fortunes of Legislative Factions in Japan." *American Political Science Review* 87, 3 (September 1993), 587-99.
- Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties*. London: Methuen, 1954.

- Leon D. Epstein, *Political Parties in Western Democracies*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1980.
- Simon Hug, *Altering Party Systems*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001.
- Kenneth Janda, "Comparative Political Parties: Research and Theory." Pp. 163-91 in *Political Science: The State of the Discipline II*, ed. Ada Finifter. Washington, DC: American Political Science Association, 1993.
- Herbert P. Kitschelt, *The Logics of Party Formation: Ecological Politics in Belgium and West Germany*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989.
- Herbert P. Kitschelt, *The Radical Right in Western Europe*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995.
- Herbert P. Kitschelt et al., *Post-Communist Party Systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Herbert P. Kitschelt, *The Transformation of European Social Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, pp. 30-149, 198-232, 280-301.
- David Laitin, "Hegemony and Religious Conflict: British Imperial Control and Religious Cleavages in Yorubaland." In *Bringing the State Back In*, eds. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, ch. 9.
- Michael J. Laver and W. Ben Hunt, *Policy and Party Competition*. New York: Routledge, 1992.
- Robert Michels, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*. New York: Collier Books, 1962; or any other edition.
- Wolfgang C. Müller, Political Parties in Parliamentary Democracies: Making Delegation and Accountability Work. *European Journal of Political Research* 37, 3 (May 2000), 309-33.
- Wolfgang C. Müller and Kaare Strøm, eds., *Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Kaare Strøm and Lars Svåsand, eds., *Challenges to Political Parties: The Case of Norway*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997, pp. 1-20.
- Angelo Panebianco, *Political Parties: Organization and Power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
- David Robertson, *A Theory of Party Competition*. London: John Wiley, 1976.
- Stein Rokkan, *State Formation, Nation-Building and Mass Politics in Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Joseph A. Schlesinger, *Political Parties and the Winning of Office*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991.
- Herbert Kitschelt, "Linkages between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Politics." *Comparative Political Studies* 33(6/7), 2000.

9. VETO PLAYERS AND POLICY OUTCOMES (3/5)

Required:

- George Tsebelis. *Veto Players*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002.
- Gary Cox and Mathew McCubbins. "The Institutional Determinants of Economic Policy Outcomes." In *Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy*, edited by Stephan Haggard and Mathew McCubbins, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Matthew Shugart and Stephan Haggard, "Institutions and Public Policy in Presidential Systems." In *Presidents, Parliaments, and Policy*, edited by Stephan Haggard and Mathew McCubbins, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Andrew MacIntyre, "Institutions and Investors: The Politics of the Economic Crisis in Southeast Asia." *International Organization* 55(1), 2001: 81-122.

10. INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (3/12)

Required:

- Philip Keefer, "What Does Political Economy Tell Us About Economic Development -- and Vice Versa?," *Annual Review of Political Science*, 7: 247-272.

- Mancur Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development." *American Political Science Review* 87(3), September 1993: 567-576.
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph Diverson, and Alastair Smith. "Political Competition and Economic Growth." *Journal of Democracy* 12(1), January 2001.
- Adam Przeworski et al., *Democracy and Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, ch. 3.
- Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini. *The Economic Effect of Constitutions*. MIT Press, 2003. Ch. 6.
- Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. "Reversal of Fortune: Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 117 : 1231-1294.
- Abhijit Banerjee and Lakshmi Iyer, "History, Institutions, and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India," *American Economic Review*, 94: 1190-1212.

Recommended:

- Temple, Jonathan. 1999. "The New Growth Evidence," *Journal of Economic Literature*, Vol. 37: 112-156.
- Aron, Janine. 2000. "Growth and Institutions: A Review of the Evidence," *The World Bank Research Observer*, 15 99- 135.
- Dani Rodrik, Arvind Subramanian, and Francesco Trebbi, "Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development," *Journal of Economic Growth*, 9: 131-165.
- Kenneth L. Sokoloff and Stanley L. Engerman, "History Lessons: Institutions, Factor Endowments, and Paths of Development in the New World," *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 14: 217-232.
- Frederic C. Lane, "Consequences of Organized Violence," *Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 18, 4: 401-417.
- Alexander Gerschenkron. *Economic backwardness in historical perspective*. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Cambridge, 1962.
- Douglass C. North and Thomas, Robert Paul. *The Rise Of The Western World; A New Economic History*. Cambridge [Eng.] University Press, 1973.
- Douglass C. North. *Structure And Change In Economic History*. New York, Norton, 1981.
- Robert H. Bates. *Markets and States in Tropical Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981.
- Nathan Rosenberg, and L. E. Birdzell. *How the West grew rich: the economic transformation of the industrial world*. New York: Basic Books, 1986.
- Margaret Levy. *Of Rule and Revenue*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.
- Hilton L. Root, "Tying the King's Hands: Credible Commitments and Royal Fiscal Policy during the Old Regime," *Rationality and Society*, Vol. 1, No. 2: 240-258.
- Douglass C. North and Barry Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment: Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice," *Journal of Economic History*, Vol. XLIX, No.4.
- Douglass C. North. *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Robert Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levy, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, and Barry Weingast. *Analytic Narratives*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998.
- Mancur Olson. *Power and Prosperity*. New York: Basic Books, 2000.
- Hernando De Soto. *The Mystery of Capital*. New York: Basic Books, 2000.
- William Easterly, William. *The Elusive Quest for Growth*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002.
- David Stasavage. *Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Avner Greif. *Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006.
- Alberto Alesina and Dani Rodrik, "Distributive Politics and Economic Growth," *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, Vol. 109: 465-490.
- Simeon Djankov, Edward Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, "The new comparative economics," *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 31: 595-619.
- Dani Rodrik, "Why We Learn Nothing from Regressing Economic Growth on Policies", mimeo: <http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~drodrik/policy%20regressions.pdf>
- Edward Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, "Do Institutions Cause Growth?," *Journal of Economic Growth*, 9: 271-303.

